


Mike Salice, CFA **Director of Research** msalice@skyhcm.com November 16, 2020

Weekly Briefing

SKYView: Vaccine Rally


On Monday, November 9. Pfizer announced that data collected from a COVID-19 vaccine under development implied an efficacy rate above 90%. leading to a strong rally in risk assets. This news, along with now diminished US election uncertainty and some positively trending macroeconomic data, led to 45 bps of spread tightening within the ICE BofA US High Yield Index (H0A0) in a single day. By Wednesday, November 11, US high yield spreads had compressed to approximately 440 bps, a level not seen since late February of this year, a period which predating the first confirmed US death from the coronavirus (February 29) and weeks before the first US counties issued shelter-in-place orders (March 16). Though aggregate index spreads are now nearly identical to February 28 levels, significant differentiation exists among and between various market cohorts. In this Weekly Briefing, we compare sector and issue-level spreads at present to those in late February 2020, identifying leaders and laggards in an effort to gauge relative value in a post-vaccine news environment.


Global markets welcomed news that a COVID-19 vaccine, jointly developed by Pfizer and BioNTech, had achieved notable success in combating the virus during phase III clinical trials. US high yield bonds tightened 45 bps in the trading session that immediately followed, capping off a five-day run (beginning with the US election) in which H0A0 compressed 103 bps. In addition to vaccine hopes and reduced political uncertainty, an inflection in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (left chart below, and a key factor in our forward-looking default regression model) combined to push high yield spreads down to ~ 440 bps, a level that hadn't been reached since before the first reported coronavirus-induced death in the US. But, while index-level spreads at present are similar to those in late February 2020, trading levels of underlying constituents, in many cases, remains dramatically different.




Source: SKY Harbor, Federal Reserve, ICE Data Indices

Given significant sector-level changes over the last several months - most notably from fallen angels entering and defaulted securities exiting the index – we created a matched sample universe limited to constituents contained within HOAO both today and in late February. Furthermore, in an effort to exclude bonds whose spread may have been influenced by technical or structural factors, we eliminated any issue that traded at distressed levels or outside of a duration range of 2 to 8 in either period. The resulting data set, which numbered 600 issues and represented nearly half a trillion dollars in face value, was then segmented by sector. Below, we chart each sector on a scatterplot, with average spreads at the time of publication along the x-axis, and average spreads at February 28, 2020, along the y-axis. Percentile rankings derived from a ratio of current to Feb 28 OAS levels show that Technology, Autos, and Consumer Goods have tightened most significantly (and now on average trade inside of late February levels), while Real Estate, Leisure, and Capital Goods compression has lagged (and on average continue to trade wide of late February levels).





Using the same matched sample universe, we repeat the process, this time breaking down some of the more diverse sectors into industry-level segmentations. Again, using percentile rankings derived from a ratio of current to Feb 28 OAS levels, we find that Metals & Mining, Health Services, and Chemicals have tightened most significantly (and now on average trade inside of late February levels), while Aerospace & Defense, Recreation & Travel, and Gaming have lagged (and on average continue to trade wide of late February levels).



Source: SKY Harbor, ICE Data Indices

Upon further examination of the scatterplots included above, trading levels of most sectors and industries appear rational. For example, Technology trading tight to February levels – at least at the sector level – seems reasonable given a strong boost from coronavirus-related stresses throughout most of 2020 (more demand to serve and protect an increasingly disperse workforce) and the prospects of secular tailwinds to persist on the likely permanence of many workfrom-home roles even when coronavirus concerns subside. Some sector trading levels, however, appear less justifiable, and may contain attractive total return opportunities. Having not suffered disproportionate credit metric degradation over the last few months, and potentially in a position to capitalize on stimulus spending and a sharp rebound in US GDP growth in 2021, should Capital Goods spreads remain persistently wide of pre-virus levels? As is most often the case, opportunities are best evaluated on a bottom-up basis.

Continuing the analysis on a more granular basis, we compared spreads of our matched sample universe at the issue level, focusing our efforts on bonds that fell in either extreme within our percentile ranking system (again using the ratio of current to Feb 28 OAS). In our view, alpha generation opportunities may exist in buying top decile laggards that are expected to fully recover in a post-vaccine world, and at the same time selling top decile leaders that are unlikely to continue to outperform once coronavirus stresses subside.

Representative Issuer Leaders & Laggards: Late Feb '20 vs. Today

bonds are among top decile leaders and laggards

Among Top Decile Lagging Group ("Cheap" screen)

Among Top Decile Lagging Group (" <u>Cheap</u> " screen)							Among Top Decile Leading Group (" <u>Rich</u> " screen)						
				Current	Late Feb						Current	Late Feb	
Bond	Moody's	S&P	Sector	OAS	OAS	Δ	Bond	Moody's	S&P	Sector	OAS	OAS	Δ
CBSR 6 1/2 05/01/27	B3	B-	Media	756	423	334	CCK 4 1/2 01/15/23	Ba3	BB-	Capital Goods	135	286	(151)
WWW 5 09/01/26	Ba 2	BB-	Retail	401	254	147	FCX 4.55 11/14/24	Ba1	BB	Basic Industry	152	298	(146)
STWD 4 3/4 03/15/25	Ba 3	B+	Real Estate	461	321	141	TROX 5 3/4 10/01/25	B3	В	Basic Industry	442	563	(121)
WYND 4.15 04/01/24	Ba 3	BB-	Leisure	371	240	131	NFLX 5 3/8 11/15/29	Ba3	BB	Media	184	303	(119)
SAH 6 1/8 03/15/27	B2	B+	Retail	461	335	127	MAT 5 7/8 12/15/27	B1	B+	Cons. Goods	249	360	(111)
PKOH 6 5/8 04/15/27	Ca a 1	B-	Capital Goods	592	501	92	ADT 4 1/8 06/15/23	Ba3	BB-	Services	177	251	(74)
TMHC 5 5/8 03/01/24	Ba 3	BB	Basic Industry	295	229	67	DELL 3 3/8 06/01/23	WR	BB-	Technology	163	205	(42)

Source: SKY Harbor, ICE Data Indices

In conclusion, US high yield spreads tightened to levels not seen since Q1'20 due to progress on the vaccine front, post-election uncertainty alleviation, and some positive macroeconomic datapoints. While index spreads in the 440 bps context are similar to those in a pre-lockdown world, there are still areas of sector, industry, and issuer-level dislocation. In our view, alpha generation opportunities may exist in buying top decile laggards that are expected to fully recover in a post-vaccine world, and at the same time selling top decile leaders that are unlikely to continue to outperform once coronavirus stresses subside.

Important Disclosures and Disclaimers

This analysis and the opinions expressed herein are intended solely for institutional and professional investors that are responsible for assessing their own risk tolerances under prevailing market conditions. SKY Harbor Capital Management, LLC ("SKY Harbor") provides this document for informational purposes only. Nothing contained in this document is or should be construed as an advertisement, or an offer to enter any contract, investment advisory agreement, a recommendation to buy or sell securities of any kind, a solicitation of clients, or an offer to invest in any particular fund, product, investment vehicle, or derivative.

This document contains forward-looking statements that are based on SKY Harbor's current views and assumptions. Forward-looking statements such as the findings of our analytical research, our outlook for interest rates, Fed policy, the economy, high yield markets and the like, or our intended adjustments to the portfolios within our strategies are subject to inherent risks, biases and uncertainties that are beyond SKY Harbor's control and may cause actual results to differ materially from the expectations expressed herein.

The information contained herein is subject to change, and SKY Harbor is under no obligation to update any information contained herein. Certain information contained in this document has been obtained from third-party sources and, although believed to be reliable, has not been independently verified, and its accuracy or completeness cannot be guaranteed.

Investing in securities involves risk of loss and past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Fixed income securities, especially high yield debt securities, are subject to loss of income and principal arising from credit risk, which is the risk that the issuer will be unable to make interest and principal payments when due. Material risks in investing in high yield debt securities also include, but are not limited to, opportunity cost (the risk that an issuer's credit trends deteriorate resulting in a higher level of compensation demanded by the market relative to the initial investment), interest rate risk, liquidity risk, selection risk, and overall market risk. In general, issuers of high yield debt securities have a greater likelihood of defaulting on the payment of interest or principal than issuers of investment grade bonds. There can be no assurance that the investment objectives described herein will be achieved or that substantial losses can be avoided.

Gross performance results do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees, which would reduce an investor's actual return. For example, assume that \$1 million is invested in an account with the Firm, and this account achieves a 6% compounded annualized return, gross of fees, for five years. At the end of five years that account would grow to \$1,338,226 before the deduction of management fees. Assuming management fees of 0.55% per year are deducted annually from the average annual AUM, the value of the account at the end of five years would be \$1,302,846, which is the equivalent of an annual compounded rate of 5.43%. For a ten-year period, the ending dollar values before and after fees would be \$1,790,848 and \$1,697,408, respectively. SKY Harbor's asset-based fees are generally billed monthly or quarterly in arrears. Please refer to the SKY Harbor's ADV Part 2A or applicable Offering Documents for more information on fees. Consultants supplied with gross results are to use this data in accordance with SEC, CFTC, NFA or the applicable jurisdiction's guidelines.

SKY Harbor is not a tax or legal advisor. Prospective investors should consult their tax or legal advisors before making tax-related investment decisions.

The ICE BofA Index data referenced herein is the property of ICE Data Indices, LLC ("ICE BofA") and/or its licensors and has been licensed for use by SKY Harbor. ICE BofA PERMITS USE OF THE ICE BofA INDICES AND RELATED DATA ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING SAME, DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE SUITABILITY, QUALITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, AND/OR COMPLETENESS OF THE BOFA INDICES OR ANY DATA INCLUDED IN, RELATED TO, OR DERIVED THEREFROM, ASSUMES NO LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE FOREGOING, AND DOES NOT SPONSOR, ENDORSE, OR RECOMMEND SKY Harbor or ANY OF ITS PRODUCTS OR SERVICES.

© 2020 SKY Harbor. This document may not be reproduced or transmitted, in whole or in part, by any means, to third parties without the prior written consent of SKY Harbor.