

Weekly Briefing


SKYView: May Market Recap

US high yield market activity in May was remarkable in many ways, with trading levels, total returns, new issuance, and default volumes registering well above historical norms. Economic data, while in many ways unprecedentedly weak on lockdown headwinds, has more often than not come in less awful than feared, further supporting a “risk-on” market sentiment. In this *Weekly Briefing* we recap key market developments in May - including a reduction in high yield bid/ask spreads, outperformance of CCCs, and the likely peaking of monthly defaults – all of which lead us to believe that the worst is now behind us.

A significant repricing of risk occurred during Q1’20 as governments around the world initiated social distancing measures to combat the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, investors were forced to extrapolate potential secular headwinds arising from presumptive future changes in consumer behavior, all while one of the longest-running expansionary periods in US history came to an end. ICE BofA US High Yield Index (HOA0) spreads widened 730 bps in just over a month in one of the most aggressive sell-offs in market history. Trading volumes, as aggregated by the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), accelerated during this period. Weekly average index turnover, including both public and 144A issues, essentially doubled, and has remained elevated even as spreads recover from March 23 wides.

Trading Activity Remains Elevated...


weekly data, trailing 1 year



Source: SKY Harbor, BofA Merrill Lynch, ICE BofA Indices

...Even Adjusted for Changes in Index Size


weekly data, trailing 1 year



Despite an uptick in trading volumes since the coronavirus pandemic began, costs associated with both buying and selling of securities have increased materially. Average US high yield bid/ask spreads peaked out at approximately 2.7 points in late March, a nearly three-fold increase relative to long-run averages. Anecdotally, we view the increase as a function of both economic uncertainty and the physical dislocation of traders on both the buy and sell sides. As the market began to rally and, presumably, market participants adapted to socially-distanced workstations, bid/ask spreads began to compress. By the end of May, higher-quality bid/ask spreads had converged closer toward long-term norms, though many CCC bonds remain costly to trade.

US High Yield Bid/Ask Spreads Beginning to Normalize


daily data through end of May, trailing 1 year



Source: SKY Harbor, BofA Merrill Lynch, ICE BofA Indices

CCC Bid/Ask Spreads Remain Elevated


daily data through end of May, trailing 1 year



The CCC sub-index returned approximately 5.9% in May, outperforming BB and single-B ratings buckets for only the second month in the last twelve (and for the first time in 2020) as investors remain willing to look past what most believe to be a temporary growth shock. CCC returns were even more notable in the context of BB dominance (the top-performing rating bucket for 14 of the last 22 months) in what has been a high-quality late-cycle period and recovery. Barring an acceleration of US-China trade tensions and/or a second lockdown later in the year, OAS levels across the rating spectrum appear reasonably attractive, still residing within or close to the widest quartile (based on 20 years of month-end data).

Rating Bucket Top Performance Months Skewed Toward BBs


monthly data, trailing 1 year



Source: SKY Harbor, ICE BofA Indices

Rating Bucket OAS Percentile Rankings Favor Barbell Approach


percentile rankings based on month-end data over the last 20 years



May default activity was elevated, with eight issuers in the leveraged credit space (bonds + loans) either filing for bankruptcy or missing a coupon payment. In total, defaults impacted \$11.2bn of debt (\$5.1bn in bonds, \$6.1bn in loans), the 4th highest monthly total in the last three years. However, bankruptcies dropped significantly relative to the prior two months, potentially signaling an April peak. Though we continue to believe US high yield bond defaults will reach 9% to 10% in 2020 (see our June 1, 2020 *Weekly Briefing* entitled “[Re-Opening Relative Value](#)” for model output), the most extreme sequential uptick may now be behind us. Furthermore, we remain cautiously optimistic that defaults will trend down in 2021. Though beyond the projection scope of our regression model, we would highlight that default rates and GDP growth tend to be highly correlated over time. Consensus expectations of an economic rebound next year – at the time of publication the median analyst surveyed by Bloomberg sees 2021 GDP growth of ~ 3.9% - would imply a reduction in defaults to levels more closely in-line with long-term annual averages (~ 4.5%).

April Default Volumes May Represent Near-Term Peak


monthly data, trailing 12 months



Source: SKY Harbor, JP Morgan, BofA Merrill Lynch, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bloomberg

'21 Est. GDP Growth Implies Long-Run Avg. Default Environment

quarterly data, trailing 15 years



In conclusion, the month of May appears to have been pivotal for the high yield market. Bid/ask spreads continue to come down, reducing transaction costs in the secondary market after an historic spike over the last few months. Additionally, CCC outperformance implies investor willingness to credit-pick outside of the highest quality portions of the market, and coincides with the potential peaking of monthly default volumes. While uncertainties remain, we view recent developments – upside surprise in several key economic indicators, progress on the re-open, new issue market strength facilitating the bolstering of corporate balance sheets, and continued fiscal stimulus measures – as offering a catalyst for further spread compression.

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